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HAPPINESS, ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS
Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer
Institutional factors in the form of direct democracy (via initiatives and referenda) and federal
structure (local autonomy) systematically and sizeably raise self-reported individual well-being
in a cross-regional econometric analysis. This positive effect can be attributed to political
outcomes closer to voters' preferences, as well as to the procedural utility of political
participation possibilities. Moreover, the results of previous microeconometric well-being func-
tions for other countries are generally supported. Unemployment has a strongly depressing
effect on happiness. A higher income level raises happiness, however, only to a small extent.
To discover the sources of people's well-being is a major concern in the social
sciences. Many inquiries have been undertaken to identify the determinants of
individual happiness. This paper analyses data on reported subjective well-
being in order to directly assess the role of democratic and federal institutions on
people's satisfaction with life. Thus, a new set of determinants is considered,
which expands previous research results showing the effects on happiness of
individual income and unemployment, as well as of aggregate unemployment,
in¯ation and income growth (see Oswald, (1997) for a survey).1
We argue that institutional conditions with regard to the extent and form of
democracy have systematic and sizeable effects on individual well-being, in
addition to demographic and economic factors. Using recent interview data
from 6,000 residents of Switzerland, we show that individuals are ceteris paribus
happier, the better developed the institutions of direct democracy are in their
area of residence. This also applies to a second institution, the degree of
government decentralisation (federalism). Finally, we are able to support some
of the earlier results for other countries and periods with new data also based
on a survey with a large sample size. In particular, we ®nd that the unemployed
are much less happy than employed persons, and that a higher household
income level only raises happiness to a small extent.
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1 `Happiness' is, for simplicity's sake, in the following interchangeably used with the terms `satisfac-
tion with life' and `reported subjective well-being'. We are aware that subjective well-being is a scienti®c
concept rather than a speci®c measure of well-being, and that it contains affective components i.e.
mood and emotions like joy, happiness or depression as well as cognitive evaluations of life satisfaction
(see e.g. Lucas et al., 1996). However, most of these measures are substantially correlated. In the current
study we use a measure of satisfaction with life.1. Determinants of Happiness
It is useful to differentiate three sets of sources of individual well-being:
(1) Personality and demographic factors. These factors have for many decades
been extensively studied by psychologists. Diener et al. (1999) provide a survey,
extending and bringing up to date the earlier surveys by Wilson (1967) and
Diener (1984). Monographs are by Argyle (1987) and Myers (1993).
(2) Micro- and macroeconomic factors. An early study of the effect of income on
happiness is due to Easterlin (1974, see also 1995), but psychologists have also
undertaken substantial work in this direction (see the survey by Diener and
Oishi, 2000). In most nations, individuals belonging to the upper income
groups report somewhat higher subjective well-being than persons with low
income. The often dramatic increase in per capita incomes in recent decades
has not raised happiness in general; the national indices for subjective well-
being have virtually remained ¯at over time (see Blanch¯ower and Oswald,
2000). In contrast to these longitudinal ®ndings for single nations, per capita
income levels and happiness are more strongly positively related across nations
(for further discussion see also Kenny, 1999).
The in¯uence of the other two major economic variables, unemployment
and in¯ation, is clear-cut. Unemployment is correlated with substantial unhap-
piness (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). As the
income level is kept constant, that in¯uence is not due to lower revenue, but
to non-pecuniary stress. In terms of a trade-off, `most regression results imply
that an enormous amount of extra income would be required to compensate
people for having no work' (Oswald, 1997, p. 1821). Individuals also have a
strong aversion towards in¯ation and are prepared to carry signi®cant cost to
evade it: `one percentage point of in¯ation corresponds to a well-being cost of
approximately two per cent of the level of income per capita' (Di Tella et al.
1997, p. 18).2
(3) The third set of in¯uences on happiness relates to the institutional (or
constitutional) conditions in an economy and society, of which democracy and
federalism are of greatest importance. To our knowledge, the impact of the
extent and design of democratic and federal institutions on subjective well-
being has, at best, been alluded to, but has not been empirically analysed.
The determinants of happiness are usually investigated under the assump-
tions that subjective well-being is cardinally measurable and interpersonally
2 These results provide welcome and important insights into a broader effort to measure empirically
individuals' reaction to, and therewith evaluation of, the in¯uence of macro-economic variables. Other
approaches are (see more extensively Frey (1991)): (i) retreat from society, or at least from the of®cial
economy, e.g. by working in the shadow sector (e.g. Cowell, 1990; Thomas, 1992); (ii) popularity and
election functions (surveys are given e.g. in Nannestad and Paldam (1994), Schneider and Frey
(1988)); (iii) political preference functions derived from the behaviour of governments and central
banks (see the survey and critique in Makin (1976)); (iv) non-conventional political participation
ranging from demonstrations to publicly motivated strikes (see e.g. Hibbs, 1976; Opp, 1989); and (v)
use of force, i.e. all sorts of revolutions and coups d'e Âtat (e.g. Hibbs, 1973; Opp et al., 1995). The well-
being functions, together with popularity and election functions, belong to the best de®ned and
statistically most advanced efforts to measure the absolute and relative importance of macro-economic
conditions for individuals.
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avoid problems in regard to a cardinal interpretation of subjective variables, it
is often possible to treat the subjective data qualitatively in econometric
analyses. In contrast, whether people associate the same degree of subjective
experience with a certain score on a ladder for life satisfaction is more dif®cult
to assess. However, there is a lot of indirect evidence that cardinalism and
interpersonal comparability are much less of a problem practically than
theoretically. The measures of subjective well-being have high consistency,
reliability and validity. Happy people are e.g. more often smiling during social
interactions (Ferna Ândez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda, 1995), are rated as happy by
friends and family members (Sandvik et al., 1993), as well as by spouses (Costa
and McCrae, 1988). Furthermore, the measures of subjective well-being have a
high degree of stability over time (Headey and Wearing, 1989) and are not
systematically biased with regard to social desirability (Konow and Earley,
1999). But there is, of course, room for methodological concerns (e.g. Diener
et al., 1999, pp. 277±8). Moreover, as will be demonstrated in this paper, the
main use of happiness measures is not to compare levels, but rather to seek to
identify the determinants of happiness.
2. Effects of Institutions on Happiness
Most political institutions tend to be stable over time, so that a cross-sectional
analysis of subjective well-being is appropriate. This has been done between
countries (e.g. by Veenhoven (1993) on the basis of the World Values Survey,
and by Diener et al., (1995)).3 It is, of course, dif®cult to isolate the effect of
particular institutions on reported individual well-being because the countries
differ in a great variety of aspects. This problem is less acute for institutional
variations within a (federal) country. Therefore, we study the case of Switzer-
land and its institutions of direct democracy. Their wide dissemination is
unique for a European country. As far as we know, this is the ®rst paper using
cross-regional variations in a happiness study. Cross-regional procedures have
been used with good results to account for the share of government expendi-
tures between governmental units with different degrees of direct participation
possibilities for its citizens (as done for the United States,4 as well as for
Switzerland5).
There are two major reasons why a higher extent of direct political participa-
tion possibilities, or more strongly developed institutions of direct democracy (in
3 The study of institutional differences is methodologically closely related to cross-country growth
analysis (see e.g. Barro, 1997). However, this literature has not yet been incorporated into happiness
research. There is also a relation to well-being measurement in research on economic development.
Dasgupta (1993), for example, provides a measure of well-being that includes standard of living as well
as indices of political and civil liberties.
4 See e.g. Matsusaka (1995) or Rueben (2000) for general government expenditure, or Santerre
(1989; 1993) for public education expenditures.
5 See e.g. Schneider and Pommerehne (1983) and Feld and Kirchga Èssner (1999) for general
government expenditures. The latter also study the effect on self-®nancing ratios, taxes, and debt.
Pommerehne and Weck (1996) and Frey (1997) analyse the effect on tax evasion, and Feld and Savioz
(1997) on per capita gross domestic product.
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citizens' subjective well-being (Cronin (1989), Budge (1996) or for an econo-
mic analysis Frey (1994)).
Firstly, due to the more active role of the citizens, (professional) politicians
are better monitored and controlled. Government activity, i.e. public outlays as
well as the many other decisions by the government, are closer to the wishes of
the citizenry.6 As a consequence, satisfaction with government output is
re¯ected in a higher level of overall well-being.
Secondly, the institutions of direct democracy extend the citizens' possibili-
ties to get involved in the political process. Experimental evidence (e.g. Tyler,
1990; Bohnet and Frey, 1999) suggests that this procedural effect is indepen-
dent of the outcome of the political activity itself.
Federal decentralisation, and, in particular, local autonomy, is another
constitutional element which can be hypothesised to positively affect citizens'
happiness. Political decision making in municipalities is closer to relevant
information about residents' preferences and also closer to direct control by
its citizens (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999).
3. Data for Econometric Analysis
Our empirical work is based on the survey results of more than 6,000 residents
of Switzerland, collected by Leu et al. (1997).7 The dependent variable called
`happiness' is based on the answers to the following question: `How satis®ed
are you with your life as a whole these days?' Simultaneously, the respondents
were shown a table with a 10 point scale of which only the two extreme values
(`completely dissatis®ed' and `completely satis®ed') were verbalised. The
survey found a high general life satisfaction in Switzerland with an average of
8.2 out of 10 points. No fewer than 29% of the interviewees reported a
satisfaction level of 10 (`completely satis®ed'), 17% of 9, and 27% of 8. The
lower end of the happiness-scale, `completely dissatis®ed' (score 1), score 2
and score 3, were indicated only by 0.4%, 0.5%, and 0.9%, respectively. As
these categories of great unhappiness are thinly populated, they are aggre-
gated, leaving us with eight happiness categories.8
In this paper, the major explanatory variable focused on is the institutiona-
lised rights of individual political participation, which vary considerably be-
tween the 26 Swiss cantons. Due to the federal structure of Switzerland, major
areas of competence are kept by the cantons (states). As on the national level,
there exist direct democratic instruments besides representative democratic
parliaments and governments. The most important direct democratic instru-
ments in cantons are the popular initiative to change the canton's constitution
6 This statement is supported by considerable empirical (econometric) evidence, e.g. Pommerehne
(1978; 1990) or Gerber (1999).
7 The survey data were collected between 1992 and 1994 in order to investigate the problem of
poverty in Switzerland. The information contained in the data set is based on personal interviews and
tax statistics.
8 The regrouping of the lowest categories does not change the qualitative results.
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changing of existing laws, and optional ®nancial referenda to prevent new
state expenditure. Citizens' access to these instruments differ from canton to
canton. Thus, for example, the number of signatures required to launch an
initiative or an optional referendum, or the time span within which the
signatures have to be collected, varies. The referendum on public expendi-
tures may be launched at different levels of additional outlays. For the 26
cantons, we constructed an index designed to re¯ect the extent of direct
democratic participation possibilities (for details of the index construction, see
the Appendix). This index is de®ned using a six point scale with 1 indicating
the lowest, and 6 the highest degree of participation possibilities for the
citizens. Fig. 1 provides an overview.
The purpose of our estimate is to show that the extent of direct democratic
participation possibilities exerts a statistically signi®cant, robust and sizeable
effect on happiness over and above the demographic and economic determi-
nants so far taken into account in the literature.
We also intend to demonstrate that institutional factors are relevant for
happiness in general by analysing the impact of federalism. The division of
competence between communities and the cantonal government re¯ects the
federal structure of a canton or, from the municipalities' point of view, their
autonomy. The extent of local autonomy is measured by an index (due to
Ladner, 1994). The index over the 26 cantons is based on survey results. Chief
local administrators in 1856 Swiss municipalities were asked to report how they
perceive their local autonomy on a 10 point scale, with one indicating `no
autonomy at all', and 10 `very high' communal autonomy.
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Direct democratic rights (index)
Fig. 1. Direct Democracy in Swiss Cantons
The ®gure shows the degree of direct democratic participation possibilities in the 26
Swiss cantons, namely Aargau (AG), Appenzell i. Rh. (AI), Appenzell a. Rh. (AR), Bern
(BE), Basel Land (BL), Basel Stadt (BS), Fribourg (FR), Gene Áve (GE), Glarus (GL),
Graubu Ènden (GR), Jura (JU), Luzern (LU), Neucha Ãtel (NE), Nidwalden (NW),
Obwalden (OW), St. Gallen (SG), Schaffhausen (SH), Solothurn (SO), Schwyz (SZ),
Thurgau (TG), Ticino (TI), Uri (UR), Vaud (VD), Valais (VS), Zug (ZG) and Zu Èrich
(ZH).
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three sets of determinants:
(1) Demographic variables
They describe the personal attributes of the respondents and comprise
· age. Six age groups are explicitly accounted for, ranging from 30 years to
80 years and older (the constant term includes the reference group `people
younger than 30');
· gender (male/female);
· citizenship (national/foreigner);
· extent of formal education (middle/high education) (in the reference
group are `people with low education');
· family setting (single woman or man; couple with children; single parent,
other, collective household) (in the reference group are `couples') and
· individual employment status (self-employed or employee in one's own
®rm; housewife or houseman; other) (in the reference group are `employed
persons').
(2) Economic variables
Two in¯uences are considered:
· Individual unemployment (the constant term includes the reference
group `employed persons');
· Income situation of the household (equivalence income). Total house-
hold income after taxes, social security expenditure, interest on debts and
maintenance is divided through the equivalence scale of the Swiss Conference
for Public Assistance. Four income groups are explicitly distinguished, ranging
from Sfr. 2,000 to Sfr. 5,000 per month and more (in the reference group are
`people with a lower equivalence income than Sfr. 2,000').
The above two sets of variables are used as controls.9 While they are of obvious
interest in themselves, they mainly serve to isolate the unbiased in¯uence of
the third set of variables.
(3) Political institutions
The variables included in the estimation models are
· an index for direct democratic rights and
· an index for the extent of local (communal) autonomy.
The latter variables refer to the 26 cantons in Switzerland. The structure of
Swiss cantons, however, does not only differ in respect of direct democracy and
federal organisation, but also in other respects, such as the degree of urbanisa-
tion. Therefore, to control for further regional differences, we include ®ve
9 We cannot address the issue of how in¯ation affects reported subjective well-being, as our data set
is a cross-section of individuals.
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community in the estimation equations.
4. Results and Discussion of the Econometric Analysis
We present the results of our econometric analysis in seven separate sections.
In Sections 4.1 to 4.4, we discuss the effects of the three sets of demographic,
economic and institutional variables on happiness. In Section 4.5 we perform
several tests of robustness. Finally, Sections 4.6 and 4.7 indicate who bene®ts
from direct democracy and that the bene®ts can be attributed to a favourable
outcome as well as to a favourable direct democratic process itself.
4.1. Microeconometric Happiness Functions
Table 1 presents the estimated coef®cients and marginal effects of two micro-
econometric happiness functions, taking into account demographic and
economic determinants as well as the institutional variable direct democratic
rights. In the ®rst equation, a weighted least squares model is estimated. In the
second one, a weighted ordered probit model is used in order to exploit the
ranking information contained in the originally scaled dependent variable.
The weighting variable that is applied allows representative results on the
subject level for Switzerland.10 Throughout the paper, we use a robust
estimator of variance because random disturbances are potentially correlated
within groups or clusters. Here, dependence refers to residents of the same
canton.11
The estimation results show statistically signi®cant effects of several demo-
graphic factors, all the economic variables and, most importantly, the institu-
tional determinant on individual happiness. The least squares estimation that
treats happiness as a cardinal variable offers qualitatively very similar results to
the ordered probit model, i.e the results are robust in regard to the estimation
method. The coef®cients of the former model can be interpreted in a simple
way: people belonging to a certain category on average report happiness scores
deviating from that of the reference group on the scale of the coef®cient.12
(For example, people of middle education on average report 0.23 score points
more satisfaction with life than people with lower education.) In the ordered
probit estimation, a positive coef®cient indicates that the probability of stating
10 Due to clustering and strati®cation in contrast to pure random sampling, weights are necessary to
get approximately unbiased point estimates. Weights are proportional to the inverse of the probability
of being sampled. In addition, the weights are adjusted to the demographic structure in 1992.
11 Ignoring the clustering in the estimation model is likely to produce downward biased standard
errors, due to the effects of aggregate variables on individual data (Moulton, 1990). To get unbiased
standard errors for the aggregate variable `direct democratic rights', the 26 cantons are used as
sampling units. (Ignoring clustering, a t-value of 5.079 instead of 3.054 is estimated in Table 1.) Apart
from clustering, strati®cation also has a downward effect on standard errors. The signi®cance levels take
into account the bias due to strati®cation, i.e. p,0:01 for jtj.2:88, 0:01,p,0:05 for 2:17,jtj,2:88
and 0:05,p,0:10 for 1:81,jtj,2:17.
12 For a continuous variable, the coef®cient indicates the increase in happiness scores when the
independent variable increases by one unit.
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effect indicates the change in the share of persons belonging to a stated
happiness level when the independent variable increases by one unit.13 In the
case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is evaluated in regard to the
reference group. For simplicity, only the marginal effects for the extreme value
of very high happiness (score 10) are shown in Table 1. (For example, being
unemployed rather than employed lowers the probability of a person stating
that he or she is completely satis®ed by 21.1 percentage points.)
4.2. Demographic and Economic Factors of Life Satisfaction
Compared to the reference group, people older than 60 are happier. Women
are not happier than men if the different employment status is considered
separately. Furthermore, foreigners are subject to a signi®cantly lower prob-
ability of reaching high happiness scores compared to the Swiss. People with
higher education report signi®cantly higher subjective well-being. Couples
without children are happier than singles, single parents and people living in
collective households.
Among the economic variables, higher income correlates with higher happi-
ness in a statistically signi®cant way. However, the differences in subjective
well-being are rather small. Consider, for example, the highest income group
with a monthly equivalence income above Sfr. 5,000. Compared to persons
with low income, only a 6.8 percentage points larger share reports being
`completely satis®ed'. As already alluded to above, unemployment has a very
large negative in¯uence on individual well-being. The coef®cient of this
variable is largest in comparison to the other signi®cant coef®cients men-
tioned.
The demographic and economic variables in the happiness equation thus
yield very similar results for Swiss data as were previously found by Blanch-
¯ower and Oswald (2000) and Di Tella et al. (1997) for other countries, in
particular the highly signi®cant and large negative effect of being unemployed,
and the small positive effect of income.14
4.3. The Effect of Direct Democracy on Subjective Well-being
Table 1 also shows the results for one of the institutional variables. The index
for direct democratic rights has a highly signi®cant positive effect on happi-
ness. An increase in the index of direct democracy by one point raises the
share of persons indicating very high satisfaction with life by 2.8 percentage
points. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the institutions of
direct democracy raise the reported subjective well-being. In addition, the
13 Alternatively, the marginal effect indicates the change of the probability belonging to a stated
happiness level when the independent variable increases by one unit.
14 Part of the correlation observed can, of course, be explained by reverse causation. For happy
people, it is easier to ®nd a partner. They probably less often lose their job and get jobs where they earn
more money.
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happiness is as large as the effect of living in the second-bottom (Sfr. 2,000-
3,000) instead of the bottom income category (, Sfr. 2,000). (ii) The effect is
even larger when the full range of the institutional variable is considered, i.e.
when individuals in canton Basel Land (with the highest democracy index of
Table 1
Direct Democracy and Satisfaction with Life in Switzerland
Weighted least squares
Std. err. adjusted to
clustering in 26 cantons
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to
clustering in 26 cantons
Variable Coef®cient t-value Coef®cient t-value
Marginal
effect
(score 10)
(1) Demographic variables
Age 30±39 ÿ0.145 ÿ1.064 ÿ0.079 ÿ0.865 ÿ0.027
Age 40±49 ÿ0.031 ÿ0.270 ÿ0.008 ÿ0.106 ÿ0.003
Age 50±59 ÿ0.177 ÿ1.898 ÿ0.081 ÿ1.275 ÿ0.027
Age 60±69 0.258 2.349 0.206 2.903 0.073
Age 70±79 0.389 2.866 0.295 3.401 0.106
Age 80 and older 0.341 2.519 0.273 2.968 0.099
Female 0.039 0.765 0.043 1.211 0.015
Foreigner ÿ0.450 ÿ5.146 ÿ0.284 ÿ5.048 ÿ0.091
Middle education 0.232 4.504 0.113 3.143 0.039
High education 0.266 3.387 0.119 2.472 0.042
Single woman ÿ0.373 ÿ6.238 ÿ0.258 ÿ6.294 ÿ0.083
Single man ÿ0.295 ÿ2.557 ÿ0.174 ÿ2.589 ÿ0.057
Couple with children ÿ0.090 ÿ1.440 ÿ0.068 ÿ1.777 ÿ0.023
Single parent ÿ0.614 ÿ3.312 ÿ0.372 ÿ3.602 ÿ0.113
Other private household ÿ0.170 ÿ1.499 ÿ0.128 ÿ1.664 ÿ0.042
Collective household ÿ0.646 ÿ3.171 ÿ0.413 ÿ3.432 ÿ0.124
Self-employed 0.058 0.796 0.072 1.413 0.025
Housewife 0.155() 2.065 0.123 2.463 0.043
Other employment status ÿ0.216() ÿ2.110 ÿ0.129() ÿ1.911 ÿ0.044
(2) Economic variables
Unemployed ÿ1.574 ÿ5.768 ÿ0.841 ÿ5.814 ÿ0.211
Equiv. income Sfr. 2,000±3,000 0.156 2.697 0.084 2.199 0.029
Equiv. income Sfr. 3,000±4,000 0.243 3.747 0.143 3.169 0.050
Equiv. income Sfr. 4,000±5,000 0.399 5.646 0.258 5.382 0.092
Equiv. income Sfr. 5,000 and more 0.302 4.938 0.192 4.277 0.068
(3) Institutional variable
Direct democratic rights 0.116 2.907 0.082 3.054 0.028
Observations 6,134 6,134
R2 0.091
Prob . F 0.049 0.001
Notes: Dependent variable: level of satisfaction on an eight point scale (scores of 1, 2 and 3 were
aggregated). White estimator for variance. In the reference group are `people younger than 30', `men',
`Swiss', `people with low education', `couples', `employed people' and `people with a lower equivalence
income than Sfr. 2,000'. Additional control variables (not shown) for size of community (5 variables)
and type of community (7 variables). Signi®cance levels: () 0.05 , p , 0.10, 0.01 , p , 0.05,
p , 0.01.
Data source: Leu et al. (1997).
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participation rights of 1.75). The former state with an 11 percentage points
higher probability that they are completely satis®ed. (iii) The improvement
affects everybody, i.e. the institutional factor is important in an aggregate
sense. In comparison, getting a job `only' raises the subjective well-being of the
unemployed.
Do happy people choose direct democratic institutions? Or, in other words,
does the causality between direct democracy and subjective well-being work in
reverse? Direct democratic participation possibilities, in the form of referenda
and initiatives in Switzerland, started to develop in the middle of the 19th
century. The adoption of some of the instruments of direct popular participa-
tion re¯ects the spread of the spirit and ideas behind the American and the
French revolutions. Equally important were political movements within the
citizenry. Citizens fought for direct democratic instruments to gain political
power against arbitrary decisions by parliaments and the in¯uence of industrial
pressure groups on these authorities in the cantons (see e.g. Ko Èlz, 1998). This
historic perspective suggests that the democratic institutions are not simply the
result of happy and satis®ed citizens. Especially during recent decades, institu-
tional conditions in Swiss cantons have been quite stable,15 which suggests that
causality runs unambiguously from direct democratic rights to satisfaction with
life.
4.4. The Effect of Federalism on Happiness
Table 2 focuses on federalism in the sense of `devolution' as a second
important political institution hypothesised to raise happiness. Therefore, the
15 The Spearman rank order correlation of the index for direct democratic rights between 1970 and
1996 is 0.803.
Table 2
Local Autonomy and Satisfaction with Life in Switzerland
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to
clustering in 26 cantons
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to
clustering in 26 cantons
Variable Coef®cient t-value
Marginal
effect
(score 10) Coef®cient t-value
Marginal
effect
(score 10)
(1) Demographic variables yes yes
(2) Economic variables yes yes
(3) Institutional variables
Local autonomy 0.098 2.913 0.033 0.036 1.005 0.012
Direct democratic rights 0.071 2.317 0.024
Observations 6,134 6,134
Prob . F 0.003 0.001
Notes: see Table 1.
Data sources: Ladner (1994) and Leu et al. (1997).
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in the happiness equation. (For simplicity, only the coef®cients for variables of
interest are shown. However, they indicate the partial effects controlling for
the demographic and economic variables included in Table 1. Moreover, the
coef®cients of the latter variables are almost unaltered.16) The estimate reveals
a statistically signi®cant positive effect on subjective well-being. For local
autonomy, the proportion of persons indicating very high happiness increases
by 3.3 percentage points, compared to a situation in which the communes are
one index point less autonomous vis-a Á-vis their canton.
Local autonomy and direct democracy are not independent of each other,
of course. On the one hand, direct democracy fosters federal structures on the
national and state level because citizens ± in contrast to politicians ± are most
interested in strong federalism (Blankart, 1998). On the other hand, the
persons bearing the costs and bene®ts of government action are better
identi®able in a decentralised system. Direct legislation, therefore, leads to
better political decisions, and federalism thus preserves direct democracy. As a
result, the indices for direct democratic rights and local autonomy are
correlated (r  0.605). This makes it impossible to separate the effects of the
two variables in one model clearly. The second equation in Table 2 jointly
includes the two constitutional factors, local autonomy and direct democratic
rights. The coef®cient for the variable measuring federalism is roughly one
third as large as when it is taken alone and it loses its signi®cance. The index
for direct democracy has only a slightly smaller marginal effect on life satisfac-
tion than estimated in Table 1, namely 0.024 instead of 0.028.17 Direct
democracy and federalism in Switzerland thus seem to be complements rather
than economic substitutes. Local autonomy is one of the several `transmission
mechanisms' of direct democracy's bene®cial effects. In the following para-
graphs, we therefore focus on direct democracy.
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis
To check the reliability of the results, several tests of robustness are performed:
(i) the in¯uence of outliers is analysed with a DFBETA-test; (ii) an ordinal
measure instead of a cardinal one is applied for the extent of direct democratic
rights; (iii) the effect of the four sub-indices on happiness is tested; and ®nally
(iv) four different aggregate control variables are used.
To investigate whether the positive correlation between direct democracy
and happiness is largely driven by a single canton, a DFBETA-test is performed.
A two-step approach is chosen. In the ®rst step, a further weighted ordered
probit model with a dummy variable for each canton is estimated. In prepara-
tion for the second step, the estimated coef®cients are correlated with the
index for direct democratic rights. Due to the problem of heteroskedasticity, a
16 The full estimation results for all the equations are available from the authors on request.
17 In an adjusted Wald test, the two institutional factors together are signi®cant on the 5% level
(Prob . F  0.016).
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in parentheses):
fixed effects for cantons ÿ 0:275
(ÿ2:653)
 0:079
(3:041)
3 index for direct democratic rights,
number of observations  26 and adjusted R2  0:248:19
With the same estimation model, 26 equations are estimated, with a different
canton omitted each time. For each equation, the estimated coef®cient for the
institutional variable is subtracted from the coef®cient in the base equation
(0.079) and divided by the estimated standard error. The resulting value is
called DFBETA. If it is greater than 1.96 in absolute value, the omitted canton
has a signi®cant in¯uence on the coef®cient of the institutional variable. Table
A3 in the Appendix shows that not one observation from a single canton has a
signi®cant in¯uence. The maximum value of the DFBETA statistic is ÿ0.829
for canton Ticino.20 This shows that the positive effect of direct democracy on
happiness is not the result of an in¯uential outlier.
The measure applied for the extent of direct democratic participation
possibilities is constructed as a cardinal index. However, the same results
should be obtained if ordinal dummy variables for direct democratic rights are
constructed. To test this claim, cantons were classi®ed into three groups:
cantons with an index score lower than four have low direct democratic rights,
cantons with an index between four and ®ve have medium direct democratic
rights, and cantons with an index score above ®ve are ranked highly with
respect to direct democratic rights. The two dummy variables for cantons with
a medium and a high ranking are included in the estimation equation
presented in Table 3. As can be seen, satisfaction with life is higher for people
living in cantons with medium and high direct democratic rights. The signi®-
cant coef®cient for the top category is 0.179. (In the reference group are
people who live in cantons with low direct democratic rights).
The variable for direct democratic participation possibilities is a non-
weighted composite index (see Appendix). This aggregation disregards various
substitutive and complementary relationships between the single components
of the index. Nevertheless, the components can be evaluated by themselves.
18 Heteroskedasticity arises because the coef®cients for the canton's dummy variables are based on
samples with largely different size. Therefore, the weighting variable contains the number of observa-
tions per canton.
19 The results for ordinary least squares are as follows:
fixed effects for cantons ÿ 0:402
(ÿ2:277)
 0:125
(3:104)
3 index for direct democratic rights,
with adjusted R2  0.257.
20 If the ®xed effect of this canton is omitted, the coef®cient for direct democratic rights increases to
0.100.
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in¯uence of each component is evaluated separately (see Table 3).
All four sub-indices of direct democratic rights have a signi®cantly positive
effect on reported subjective well-being. The coef®cients for the two sub-indices
for the right to change the canton's law or the canton's constitution with a
legislative or constitutional popular initiative are largest. Thus, the possibility of
putting new questions on the political agenda is of special importance for the
bene®cial effects of direct democracy on citizens individual well-being.
In order to test for alternative explanations of the cross-regional differences
in happiness, the effect of some aggregate control variables is estimated on its
own as well as jointly with the institutional variable. Table 4 exhibits the results
for the two macroeconomic variables `national income per capita' and `total
tax burden', as well as for the two language variables `French speaking canton'
and `Italian speaking canton'. Equations (1) and (2) indicate that national
income per capita does not in¯uence happiness signi®cantly, whether it is
controlled for institutional differences or not. The same holds for the variable
total tax burden in (3) and (4). As can be seen, the introduction of these two
macroeconomic variables does not (much) affect the size and signi®cance of
the direct democracy variable. In contrast, the variables for majority language
are signi®cantly correlated with reported satisfaction with life, i.e. living in a
French speaking canton means signi®cantly lower happiness, whereas living in
the Italian speaking canton Ticino means signi®cantly higher reported sub-
Table 3
Sensitivity Analysis: Ordinal Variable and Sub-Indices for Direct Democracy
Weighted ordered probit, std. err. adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Demographic variables yes yes yes yes yes
(2) Economic variables yes yes yes yes yes
(3) Institutional variables
Direct democratic rights
index between 4 and 5
0.114
(1.733)
Direct democratic rights
index above 5
0.179
(2.308)
Index for constitutional
initiative
0.060
(2.311)
Index for legislative
initiative
0.072
(2.891)
Index for legislative
referendum
0.042()
(1.945)
Index for ®nancial
referendum
0.059
(3.075)
Observations 6,134 6,134 6,134 6,134 6,134
Prob . F 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004
Notes: see Table 1. Coef®cients with signi®cance levels. t-values in parentheses. In the reference group
in (1) are cantons with direct democratic rights lower than 4.
Data sources: Leu et al. (1997).
21 The correlation between the four sub-indices is shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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cantons can to a large extent be explained by weaker direct democratic rights
(6). In (6) the coef®cient of the institutional variable is almost unchanged and
still signi®cant (p , 0.05). It can be concluded that the extent of direct
democracy has a robust in¯uence on happiness.
4.6. Who Bene®ts from Direct Democracy?
Are the bene®cial effects of direct democracy restricted to some privileged
groups? To investigate this important question of equality, we analyse the
in¯uence of direct democracy for groups of persons sharing common charac-
teristics in regard to sex, education, employment status and income. Techni-
cally, interaction variables are included in the estimation equation, in addition
to the demographic and economic variables. The interaction variables are the
product of dummy variables for the personal characteristics and the index for
direct democratic rights.
The bene®ts of direct democracy reaped by women are smaller than for
men. However, the difference is not statistically signi®cant. There is also no
signi®cant difference between the three levels of education and the ®ve
categories of employment status distinguished, i.e. the positive effect of direct
Table 4
Sensitivity Analysis: Aggregate Control Variables
Weighted ordered probit, std. err. adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Demographic
variables
yes yes yes yes yes yes
(2) Economic
variables
yes yes yes yes yes yes
(3) Institutional
variable
Direct democratic
rights
0.087
(3.223)
0.084
(2.698)
0.080
(2.806)
(4) Macroeconomic
conditions
National income per
capita in canton
(in 1,000) in 1992
ÿ1.8 3 10ÿ4
(ÿ0.054)
ÿ0.004
(ÿ1.256)
Total tax burden
(index) in canton
in 1992
ÿ0.002
(ÿ1.340)
2.7 3 10ÿ4
(0.171)
(5) Majority
language
French speaking
canton
ÿ0.213
(ÿ3.554)
ÿ0.076
(ÿ1.123)
Italian speaking
canton
0.073()
(1.963)
0.252
(3.337)
Observations 6,134 6,134 6,134 6,134 6,134 6,134
Prob . F 0.005 0.007 2.0 3 10ÿ4 0.002 0.010 0.001
Notes: see Table 1. Coef®cients with signi®cance levels. t-values in parentheses.
Data sources: Leu et al. (1997) and Swiss Federal Statistical Of®ce (1997).
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certain employment status. We have also analysed whether direct democracy
raises the happiness of high income recipients, while not doing so for low
income recipients. However, the interaction variables do not show any statisti-
cally signi®cant differences. The positive effect of direct democracy on happi-
ness applies to all income classes, and is not restricted to a particular one.
Overall, our analysis indicates that direct democracy is not used to discrimi-
nate against certain groups within society. The bene®ts are distributed rather
evenly among social classes. However, as in other countries, a large proportion
of residents is formally excluded from participation in the direct democratic
process, namely foreigners. In the next paragraph, it is argued that they can
reap only part of the utility derived from direct democracy.
4.7. Direct Democracy and Procedural Utility
Do citizens derive procedural utility from the possibility of participating in the
directly democratic process? To answer this question, it is crucial to note that
political participation in initiatives and referenda is restricted to Swiss na-
tionals; only they can reap the respective procedural utility. Foreigners, in
contrast, have in general no political participation rights. However, they
cannot be discriminated from the favourable outcome of direct democracy
(outcome utility). As foreigners cannot reap procedural utility from political
participation, they are hypothesised to gain less from direct democracy than
Swiss citizens. This can be tested either by considering an interaction effect
between direct democracy and being a foreigner or by running separate
equations for foreigners and Swiss.22 The results for the latter test are shown in
Table 5.23
In both equations, direct democratic rights have a positive effect on
reported subjective well-being. However, a direct comparison of the two coef®-
cients for direct democratic rights suggests that foreigners bene®t less than
Swiss citizens in cantons in which the institutions of direct democracy are well
22 Two separate regressions allow different coef®cients for the control variables of the sample for
foreigners and for Swiss citizens and thus foster the ceteris paribus interpretation of the results of the
institutional variable.
23 The results for the former test (a weighted ordered probit estimation with clustering in cantons)
are as follows:
satisfaction with life  ... ÿ0:042
(ÿ0:283)
being a foreigner ... 0:097
3:384
3 index for direct democratic rights ÿ0:067
(ÿ1:699)
3 interaction term (index for direct democratic rights 3 being a foreigner),
with t-values in parentheses. The coef®cient for the index of direct democracy is positive and statistically
highly signi®cant. This effect accounts for everybody, whether a Swiss citizen or a foreigner. The
interaction variable shows that foreigners are ceteris paribus relatively less happy compared to Swiss
citizens in cantons in which the institutions of direct democracy are well developed. However, the
positive effect accounting for everybody is not compensated. This suggests, ®rstly, that foreigners are
still better off in a more direct democratic canton and, secondly, that procedural utility, in addition to
outcome utility, is an important source of satisfaction related to direct democracy.
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directly democratic cantons uses its institutional possibilities to exploit the
minority of foreigners.
The size of the procedural utility gained from being able to participate in
the direct democratic process can also be assessed. Comparing the positive
marginal effect for direct democracy of 3.4 percentage points for Swiss citizens
with the marginal effect of 1.0 percentage points for foreigners suggests that
two thirds of the gain in well-being is due to the application of a favourable
process in political decision-making.24 Procedural utility, over and above out-
come utility, is an important source of satisfaction due to direct democracy.
An alternative interpretation of these results can be advanced on the basis of
the missing variables problem. Assuming that foreigners and Swiss citizens are
equally affected by unobserved regional factors, the causal effect of direct
democratic rights on happiness is identi®ed by the difference in the coef®-
cients for this variable between the two groups.25 According to this interpreta-
tion, the marginal effect of direct democratic rights on subjective well-being is
slightly smaller, namely 3.4 minus 1.0, i.e. 2.4 percentage points instead of 2.8
percentage points as estimated in Table 1.
5. Conclusions
With data from interviews of more than 6,000 Swiss residents, we have adduced
strong evidence that institutional (or constitutional) factors exert a systematic
and sizeable positive in¯uence on reported happiness. The existence of
Table 5
Satisfaction with Life of Foreigners and Swiss in Switzerland
Foreigners
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to
clustering in 26 cantons
Swiss
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to
clustering in 26 cantons
Variable Coef®cient t-value
Marginal
effect
(score 10) Coef®cient t-value
Marginal
effect
(score 10)
(1) Demographic variables yes yes
(2) Economic variables yes yes
(3) Institutional variable
Direct democratic rights 0.035 0.951 0.010 0.098 3.270 0.034
Observations 743 5,391
Prob . F 0.002 0.006
Notes: see Table 1.
Data source: Leu et al. (1997).
24 Quantitatively very similar results are obtained if interaction terms for direct democratic rights
and being Swiss and being foreigner, respectively, are included in one equation instead of estimating
two separate regressions.
25 This interpretation is analogous to the differences-in-differences estimator for time series as e.g.
applied in Card (1990).
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referenda, and of decentralised (federal) government structures raises the
subjective well-being of people.
The in¯uence of these political institutions on happiness is consistent with
the hypothesis that politicians in a strongly developed direct democracy are
forced to follow the preferences of the voters more than when direct popular
participation rights are less well developed. Moreover, the citizens gain
procedural utility from the fuller possibilities of directly participating in the
political process. Foreigners living in Switzerland are more likely to bene®t
from the outcome than from the process (from which they are excluded). We
®nd indeed that foreigners tend to reap systematically positive but lower
satisfaction from living in a canton with strongly developed direct participation
rights than do the Swiss.
These results, with respect to the institutional determinants of happiness,
are obtained even if the `standard' determinants of happiness due to demo-
graphic and economic factors are controlled for, and a number of robustness
checks are undertaken.
In consonance with other happiness studies, unemployment is associated
with a considerably lower level of subjective well-being. A higher equivalence
income has a statistically signi®cant positive but small effect on happiness.
University of Zurich
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Appendix
Index for Direct Democratic Rights and Local Autonomy in Swiss Cantons
Direct democracy is here de®ned in terms of individual political participation possibi-
lities. In Switzerland, institutions for the direct political participation of citizens exist
on the level of the federal state as well as on the level of cantons. However, the direct
democratic rights on the level of cantons are very heterogeneous. Therefore, an index
is constructed to measure the different barriers to citizens entering the political
process, apart from elections in the year 1992. The index is based mainly on data
collected in Trechsel and Serdu Èlt (1999) (for details see Stutzer, 1999).
The four main legal instruments directly in¯uencing the political process in Swiss
cantons are
(a) the popular initiative to change the canton's constitution,
(b) the popular initiative to change the canton's law,
(c) the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new law or changing law
and
(d) the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure.
Barriers are in terms of
(a) the necessary signatures to launch an instrument (absolute and relative to the
number of citizens with the right to vote),
(b) the legally allowed time span to collect the signatures and
(c) the level of new expenditure per head allowing a ®nancial referendum.
(Compulsory referenda are treated like referenda with the lowest possible barrier.)
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barrier, `six' a low one. From the resulting ratings, a non-weighted average is calculated
for each instrument (i.e. four sub-indices) and for the composite index, which
represents the measure of direct democratic rights in Swiss cantons. The results are
presented in Table A1.
The index for local autonomy is based on survey results by Ladner (1994). Chief
local administrators in 1856 Swiss municipalities reported how they perceive their local
autonomy on a 10 point scale, with one indicating `no autonomy at all', and 10 `very
high' communal autonomy. Average scores for each canton are also shown in Table
A1.
Table A1
Index for Direct Democratic Rights and Local Autonomy in Swiss Cantons
Direct democracy
Canton
Index for
constitutional
initiative
Index for
legislative
initiative
Index for
legislative
referendum
Index for
®nancial
referendum
Composite
index for
direct demo-
cratic rights
Local
autonomy
Aargau 5.67 5.67 6.00 4.50 5.46 4.9
Appenzell i. Rh. 6.00 6.00 6.00 3.00 5.25 5.0
Appenzell a. Rh. 6.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 5.50 5.8
Bern 2.67 2.67 3.67 5.00 3.50 4.6
Basel Land 6.00 6.00 6.00 4.75 5.69 4.3
Basel Stadt 4.67 4.67 4.00 4.25 4.40 5.5
Fribourg 2.67 2.67 2.33 2.00 2.42 4.2
Gene Áve 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.75 3.2
Glarus 6.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 5.50 5.6
Graubu Ènden 4.00 5.00 6.00 4.00 4.75 5.8
Jura 4.67 4.67 3.00 2.50 3.71 4.0
Luzern 4.67 5.33 3.67 4.25 4.48 4.1
Neucha Ãtel 2.67 2.67 1.67 1.50 2.13 3.7
Nidwalden 2.67 6.00 6.00 5.00 4.92 5.5
Obwalden 5.33 6.00 6.00 5.00 5.58 6.0
Sankt Gallen 3.33 4.00 3.00 3.25 3.40 4.9
Schaffhausen 5.33 5.33 5.17 4.50 5.08 6.1
Solothurn 5.33 5.33 6.00 5.00 5.42 4.9
Schwyz 5.33 5.33 4.67 4.38 4.93 4.6
Thurgau 3.67 3.67 4.33 4.50 4.04 5.9
Ticino 1.33 2.67 1.67 2.75 2.10 4.3
Uri 5.67 5.67 5.33 5.00 5.42 5.4
Vaud 2.33 2.33 2.00 3.00 2.42 4.7
Valais 3.00 3.67 6.00 1.00 3.42 5.5
Zug 5.00 5.00 3.67 4.00 4.42 6.0
Zu Èrich 3.33 3.33 6.00 4.00 4.17 5.4
Sources: Ladner (1994) and own calculations on the basis of Trechsel and Serdu Èlt (1999).
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Correlation of Sub-indices and Composite Index for Direct Democratic Rights and
Local Autonomy in Swiss Cantons
CI LI LR FR DDR LA
Index for constitutional
initiative (CI)
1.000
Index for legislative
initiative (LI)
0.871 1.000
Index for legislative
referendum (LR)
0.669 0.772 1.000
Index for ®nancial
referendum (FR)
0.539 0.632 0.562 1.000
Composite index for direct
democratic rights (DDR)
0.888 0.943 0.877 0.767 1.000
Local autonomy (LA) 0.410 0.506 0.646 0.531 0.605 1.000
Table A3
Sensitivity Analysis: DFBETA-Test for 26 Swiss Cantons
Independent variable: direct democratic rights
Omitted observation ^ â0 DFBETA Omitted observation ^ â0 DFBETA
Aargau 0.078 0.030 Nidwalden 0.079 0.007
Appenzell i. Rh. 0.079 ÿ0.007 Obwalden 0.073 0.264
Appenzell a. Rh. 0.073 0.241 Sankt Gallen 0.082 ÿ0.108
Bern 0.081 ÿ0.072 Schaffhausen 0.083 ÿ0.161
Basel Land 0.088 ÿ0.325 Solothurn 0.081 ÿ0.049
Basel Stadt 0.078 0.065 Schwyz 0.078 0.062
Fribourg 0.073 0.217 Thurgau 0.079 0.025
Gene Áve 0.080 ÿ0.035 Ticino 0.100 ÿ0.829
Glarus 0.080 ÿ0.027 Uri 0.077 0.073
Graubu Ènden 0.080 ÿ0.025 Vaud 0.058 0.775
Jura 0.079 0.002 Valais 0.080 ÿ0.024
Luzern 0.084 ÿ0.186 Zug 0.078 0.042
Neucha Ãtel 0.075 0.139 Zu Èrich 0.082 ÿ0.117
Notes: A value of DFBETA greater than 1.96 in absolute value shows an in¯uential observation. Weight:
inverse of the number of observations per canton. Signi®cance levels: 0.01 , p , 0.05, p , 0.01.
Data source: Leu et al. (1997).
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